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SOCIAL JUSTICE AS A NECESSARY 
GUIDE TO PUBLIC HEALTH 
DISASTER RESPONSE 
BY: STEPHEN S. HANSON*+  
The U.S. has no clear federal policy for how scarce medical resources are 
to be distributed, particularly in disasters or cases of similar urgency. This 
partly comes from being insulated from the impacts of many potential disasters 
by wealth and other factors but also comes from a historical unwillingness to 
make difficult medical ethical decisions based on questions of justice.1 
Distribution of solid organs for transplant is one of the few areas where we 
have carefully thought about just distribution, and it is almost entirely unique in 
having a carefully considered and complex distribution mechanism.2 As such, 
discussions about appropriate distribution of scarce resources in something like 
disaster triage are in a much more basic stage than our discussions about, say, 
informed consent.3 
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 1. This will not be argued here, but consider that at the same time we had, Canterbury v. Spence, 
464 F.2d 722, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1972), being decided in a way that helped us properly navigate goals of 
respecting patient autonomy and providing for patient’s best interests, the U.S. also established the 
Medicare End-Stage Renal Disease benefit, which essentially decided not to ask questions of 
distribution of scarce resources but rather chose to provide access to that one resource sufficiently to 
make it not scarce and thus to make the question go away. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395rr(a) (explaining 
Medicare benefit is available for anyone diagnosed with end-stage renal disease). Had the decision been 
made by explicit choice to treat questions of distribution of resources by making them non-scarce, that 
would have been a justifiable decision that embraced rather than dodged the challenge of health resource 
distribution, but of course that path was not followed for other forms of treatment. For example, access 
to chemotherapy and the like remained rationed by ability to pay. 
 2. See 42 U.S.C. § 274(b)(2)(B) (2019) (codifying of the National Organ Transplantation Act 
which establishes the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network to establish criteria for organ 
allocation); see also 42 C.F.R. § 121.8 (2019) (establishing allocation methods for organs). 
 3. As a minor but important point here, I want to distinguish between truly scarce resources and 
not truly scarce resources, and for one specific reason: The discussion about rationing of health care 
resources often means distribution of things such as access to primary health care and access to adequate 
health insurance, as raised in the Affordable Care Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b) (2018) (establishing 
requirements for essential health benefits that plans must provide). What these questions are primarily 
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A common decision in scarce resource distribution is to seek to produce 
the best results in a utilitarian fashion.4 See, e.g., Alastair Browne, who 
concludes that in times of blood shortage:  
[B]lood should be allocated to such patients solely on the basis of 
who has the best chance of maximum life extension, where this is 
calculated with the help of a point system by taking into account the 
probability of survival to discharge, comorbid conditions, and the 
age of the patient.5 
Additionally, Philip Rosoff holds that in cases of drug shortages, “[t]he 
foremost criterion for giving one patient access to a scarce drug over another 
should be demonstrable evidence of a superior clinical therapeutic effect in the 
selected patient.”6  In situations of military (or disaster) triage where the 
number of patients quickly overwhelm the routine medical assets available, 
patients with the greatest chance of survival with the least expenditure of time, 
equipment, supplies, and personnel are to be treated first.7 Perhaps the more 
common viewpoint is to simply take for granted that the factors of saving the 
most lives and maximizing life-years are the only relevant factors to consider 
when distributing scarce resources, and proceed from there.8 
Following this account, when resources are truly scarce, we should treat 
those most likely to live the longest, and avoid treatment of the sick and 
elderly. Nothing in this requires ignoring adequate palliative and comfort care 
for persons who would not receive the scarce resources, and several of these 
 
about is money, primarily in the distribution of insurance and affordable access to otherwise available 
care. Whatever else may be true, money is not a scarce resource in U.S. health care. See CTRS, FOR 
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURES 2018 HIGHLIGHTS (2018), 
https://www.cms.gov/files/document/highlights.pdf (explaining total U.S. health care expenditures 
reached $3.6 trillion in 2018). It may be poorly allocated, spent in inefficient ways, or otherwise less 
than justly or wisely distributed, but in the country that spends the most per person on health care by far, 
money is not scarce. See id. (explaining that in 2018 health expenditures per person was greater than 
$11,000). I mean really scarce resources, like solid organs, occasionally blood, short-term shortages of 
vaccines in some cases, and limited resources available in disasters like, e.g., Katrina and New Orleans. 
This may also eventually mean physician and nursing person-hours (if patterns do not change). It will 
not, in any foreseeable future not involving collapse of the health care system, include money. 
 4. Robert Baker & Martin Strosberg, Triage and Equality: A Historical Reassessment of 
Utilitarian Analyses of Triage, 2 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 103, 104-05 (1992). 
 5. Alastair Browne, Blood in a Time of Scarcity, 22 CAMBRIDGE  Q. OF HEALTHCARE ETHICS 159, 
167, (2013). 
 6. Philip M. Rosoff, Unpredictable Drug Shortages: An Ethical Framework for Short-Term 
Rationing in Hospitals, THE AM.  J. OF BIOETHICS 1, 3 (2012). 
 7. Thomas B. Repine et al., The Dynamics and Ethics of Triage: Rationing Care in Hard Times, 
170 MIL. MED. 505, 505-06 (2005). 
 8. Samuel J. Kerstein & Greg Bognar, Complete Lives in the Balance, 10 AM. J. OF BIOETHICS 37, 
37 (2010). 
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authors make that explicitly clear.9 Some accounts also argue that we ought to 
treat clinicians because if cured or prophylactically vaccinated they can 
continue to provide care; the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(hereinafter “CDC”) advocates this in regards to allocation of pandemic 
influenza vaccines.10 There is a reason why this line of argument is commonly 
promoted – it makes practical and ethical sense on first glance. When posited 
against views that would prefer distribution for wealthy donors, those who can 
best game the system, or racist and classist distributions, this position appears 
obviously superior.  Furthermore, on its face it appears neutral with regard to 
race, gender, wealth, and the like, as all that matters is whether and how much 
the recipient will benefit from the resource.11 It may also seem preferable to 
other presumably inequity-blind methods of distribution such as lotteries or 
first-come first serve approaches, which might lead to extremely inefficient 
distributions.12 When, for example, Philip Rosoff states that “[h]ence, a 
minimum criterion for fairness must be to treat people the same who are 
similarly situated—in this case, clinically situated,” this conclusion stated in 
this fashion seems basic and inarguable.13  
The problem with this approach is that, contrary to the initial impression 
of inequality-blindness, it privileges the powerful, and unequally harms those 
who are least well off.14 Naomi Zack notes that disaster magnifies social 
inequality: “In every civilian disaster thus far, the already disadvantaged have 
suffered most…”15 In cases of natural disasters where evacuation is 
appropriate, this often occurs because the “poor are less physically mobile than 
those with more money.”16 Both their access to vehicles, and familial or 
community ties to their neighborhood can keep less affluent persons from 
 
 9. See Marianne Matzo et al., Palliative Care Considerations in Mass Casualty Events with 
Scarce Resources, 7 BIOSECURITY & BIOTERRORISM: BIODEFENSE STRATEGY PRAC & SCI. 199, 200 
(2009) (explaining the need for palliative care in mass casualty events). 
 10. See CTRS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, INTERIM UPDATED PLANNING GUIDANCE ON 
ALLOCATING AND TARGETING PANDEMIC INFLUENZA VACCINE DURING AN INFLUENZA PANDEMIC 2, 
10 (2018), https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/national-strategy/planning-guidance/pandemic-
severities-tier-1.html (explaining CDC guidance of prioritizing front-line healthcare workers in the case 
of a limited vaccine supply during a pandemic influenza). 
 11. See Browne, supra note 5, at 167 (explaining that blood should be allocated based on who has 
the best chance of maximum life extension). 
 12. Govind Persad et al., Principles for Allocation of Scarce Medical Interventions, 373 LANCET 
423, 423-24 (2009). 
 13. Rosoff, supra note 6, at 5. 
 14. See Social Determinants of Health: Know What Affects Health, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL 
& PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/socialdeterminants/index.htm (last updated Jan. 29, 2018) 
[hereinafter Social Determinants of Health] (explaining how poverty, unstable housing, low income, and 
living in unsafe neighborhoods can affect health). 
 15. NAOMI ZACK, ETHICS FOR DISASTER 106 (James P. Sterba ed., 2009). 
 16. Id. at 110. 
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evacuating in cases of danger.17 In cases of disaster triage, the increased risk 
occurs because socially disadvantaged persons will already be less healthy.18 
Multiple assessments of social determinants of health have made it very 
clear that persons who are poorer financially have poorer health, have fewer 
resources available to change health habits, die sooner, and have more co-
morbidities, than those who are wealthier.19 In the U.S. the same is true of 
persons who are non-white, and those factors interact with each other.20 For 
both socio-economic status and ethnicity in the U.S., being less well-off 
correlates with being less healthy.21 One need not be a Rawlsian to argue that 
this issue must be considered in determining how to distribute scarce resources, 
especially if there are other alternatives with plausible moral justification; 
Philip Rosoff’s above determination of the primary criterion for fair selection – 
similar clinical situation – ignores the crucial issue that the previously 
disadvantaged will generally not be the persons most likely to obtain the best 
results from a scarce resource.22 Consequently, this fact that appeared to be 
basic and inarguable is also wrong: the minimum criteria for fairness must also 
include an assessment of inequality headed into the need for the scarce 
resource.23 
I argue that ethical analysis of the possible policies for the allocation of 
scarce resources in cases of disaster or mass casualty incidents must take 
matters of justice into account. We must reject using methods that attempt to 
maximize results while ignoring prior inequalities related to ethnicity or 
socioeconomic status which are among the greatest social determinants of 
health.24 If we focus on maximizing results, we will unjustly exacerbate the 
inequalities in society at a time of high stress when abuse of the power 
 
 17. Id. at 110-13. 
 18. See Social Determinants of Health, supra note 14 (explaining how social disadvantages affect 
health). 
 19. See Christopher J. L. Murray et al., Eight Americas: Investigating Mortality Disparities across 
Races, Counties, and Race-Counties in the United States, 3 PLOS MED 1513, 1513 (2006) (explaining 
difference in life expectancy cannot be explained by race, income, or healthcare access alone); see also 
Social Determinates of Health, supra note 14 (explaining how poverty, unstable housing, low income, 
and living in unsafe neighborhoods can affect health). 
 20. Murray, supra note 19, at 1513. 
 21. Murray, supra note 19, at 1513; see also Christopher J. L. Murray et al., Eight Americas: New 
Perspectives on US Health Disparities, 29 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 4, 4 (2005) (explaining disparities 
in mortality and health between race/ethnic groups and socio-economic status). 
 22. Elizabeth Lee Daugherty Biddison et al., Too Many Patients…A Framework to Guide Statewide 
Allocation of Scarce Mechanical Ventilation During Disasters, 155 CHEST 848, 850 (2019); Rosoff, 
supra note 6, at 3. 
 23. See Michael Joffe & Jenny Mindell, Health Impact Assessment, 62 OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. 
MED. 907, 910 (2005) (explaining health policies should assess impacts on existing inequalities). 
 24. Samantha Artiga & Elizabeth Hilton, Beyond Health Care: The Role of Social Determinates of 
Health in Promoting Health and Health Equity, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. 1, 2 (2018), 
http://files.kff.org/attachment/issue-brief-beyond-health-care. 
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structures in society will be likely to be more common.25 This may also have 
implications for other distributions of scarce resources, such as allocation of 
solid organs for transplant.26 
I. ANALYSIS OF METHODS 
Consider as a possibility the triage of patients in the what the CDC ranks 
as the mildest “moderate” pandemic influenza scenario, wherein 800,000 will 
require hospitalization and 160,000 will require ICU care, possibly with 
assisted ventilation.27 Since in 2010 the U.S. was estimated to have about 
62,188 ventilators in total, this would place a severe strain on the available 
resources even in a “moderate” scenario.28 In such a case, the CDC predicts 
48,000 deaths, although that number could be mitigated by public health 
actions.29 These numbers may seem manageable, as the 2014-15 seasonal 
influenza required over 970,000 hospitalizations, which was largely 
accommodated by current resources.30 The problem may be that, as pandemic 
influenzas in the past have peaked in short periods of time, the needs for 
resources will be concentrated into a short time period that could then 
overwhelm resources that could have been adequate if needed over a longer 
period.31 Further, assuming conditions like the 1918 influenza pandemic could 
involve over 11 million hospitalizations, 3.5 million needing ICU care, and an 
expected 1.93 million deaths, which would certainly overwhelm any set of 
resources actually available.32  
Assuming the moderate scenario, there would be 160,000 persons needing 
ICU care over a fairly short period of time in a country that has somewhere 
around 100,000 ICU beds, of which around 20% are neonatal beds, and about 
two-thirds are already occupied on a given day.33 Some significant triaging 
 
 25. See Biddison et al., supra note 22 at 850 (explaining how a system that looks towards prospects 
for long-term survival further disadvantages the poor and persons of color). 
 26. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 274 (2019) (establishing the framework for the National Organ 
Distribution). 
 27. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., PANDEMIC FLU PLAN: 2017 UPDATE 44 (2017), 
https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/pdf/pan-flu-report-2017v2.pdf. 
 28. Lewis Rubinson et al., Mechanical Ventilators in the US Acute Care Hospitals, 4 DISASTER 
MED & PUB. HEALTH PREPAREDNESS 199, 203 (2010). 
 29. PANDEMIC FLU PLAN: 2017 UPDATE, supra note 27, at 44. 
 30. Influenza (Flu): Summary of the 2014-2015 Influenza Season, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pastseasons/1415season.htm, (last updated Feb. 11, 2019). 
 31. See Hiroshi Nakagawa & Takehide Onuma, Experience of Triage During an A/H1N1 Influenza 
Pandemic in After-Hours Emergency Centers, 55 JAPAN MED. ASSOC. J. 312, 317 (2012) (explaining the 
experience of after-hours emergency center centers during the peak of the 2009 H1N1 outbreak in 
Sendai). 
 32. PANDEMIC FLU PLAN: 2017 UPDATE, supra note 27, at 42-44. 
 33. Critical Care Statistics, SOC’Y OF CRITICAL CARE MED., 
https://www.sccm.org/Communications/Critical-Care-Statistics; see also PANDEMIC FLU PLAN: 2017 
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would be necessary, in even a moderate scenario, and even the best triage 
would seem to be unable to provide all needed treatments to all persons in 
need.34 
A results-based approach to such a pandemic rations out the scarce 
medical resources in whatever way will produce the best result.35 That result 
might be measured in lives saved, or an approach might use some methodology 
to more precisely measure the value of given results like seeking to save the 
most Quality-Adjusted Life Years (QALYs), but regardless of the details the 
doling out of health care is guided by the need to produce those results.36 
Consequently, persons who are most likely to benefit, and benefit the most, 
from a particular treatment are the ones who are most likely to be allocated that 
treatment.37 This means that persons with other significant comorbidities, 
including persons with current pulmonary challenges that might be seen as 
likely to affect their success in recovery from ventilator distress, such as 
lifetime smoking habits or  exposure to environmental air hazards, would be 
less likely to be allocated scarce ventilator or ICU support.38 
However, the factors that would make one unlikely to be a candidate for 
producing the highest number of life-years are neither evenly nor fairly 
distributed across society.39 Problematic comorbidities would be over-loaded in 
persons of lower socio-economic status and minority status.40 We know that in 
the U.S. rates of smoking, diabetes, and overall poorer health are higher in 
persons of lower socio-economic status, Native Americans, and African 
Americans.41 If these factors are used to distribute resources by utilitarian 
 
UPDATE, supra note 27, at 42-44 (explaining the number of persons requiring ICU hospitalization in the 
case of a pandemic influenza). 
 34. Michael D. Christian et al., Development of a Triage Protocol for Critical Care During an 
Influenza Pandemic, 175 CANADIAN MED. ASS’N. J. 1377, 1380 (2009). 
 35. See id. (explaining that a triage protocol seeks to maximize benefits for the largest number of 
people). 
 36. See Persad et al., supra note 12, at 424, 427 (explaining different approaches to scarce resource 
allocation). 
 37. See Tia Powell et al., Allocation of Ventilators in a Public Health Disaster, 2 DISASTER MED. 
& PUB. HEALTH PREPAREDNESS 20, 23 (2008) (explaining exclusion criteria for ventilator allocation 
focuses on those with high risk of mortality even with ventilator treatment). 
 38. See Matthew Sztajnkrycer et al., Unstable Ethical Plateaus and Disaster Triage, 25 
EMERGENCY MED. CLINICS OF N. AM. 749, 761 (2006) (explaining how one cannot choose one’s 
position in life or underlying health which can be relevant in resource allocation); see also Social 
Determinants of Health, supra note 14 (explaining social determinants of health). 
 39. See generally Murray et al., supra note 19, at 1520 (showing how differences in mortality 
disparities are distributed across society). 
 40. See Biddison et al., supra note 22, at 850 (explaining that a system that looks to prospects for 
long-term survival will further disadvantage those who are already systematically disadvantaged). 
 41. Murray et al., supra note 19, at 1513; Denise B. Kandel et al., Racial/Ethnic Differences in 
Cigarette Smoking Initiation and Progression to Daily Smoking: A Multilevel Analysis, 94 AM. J. PUB. 
HEALTH 128, 132 (2004). 
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analyses – as they would under a results-based methodology – then that triage 
would prefer those who are already socially advantaged.42 
This is an example of a challenge to universal programs that are designed 
to provide a universally valuable resource equally to all persons in society, but 
which fail to do so in actual practice.43 For instance, john a. powell [sic – he 
intentionally does not capitalize his name] notes that the Interstate Highway act 
of 1956 is a good example of such a program.44 Presumably this was conceived 
as a resource that would benefit everyone, as the mobility granted by interstates 
applied to all who drove, took buses, or enjoyed the results of interstate 
commerce.45 But, interstates also displaced, surrounded, or damaged downtown 
neighborhoods while creating easy access to suburbs, enabling decades of 
white flight after Brown v. Board of Education, also in 1956.46 The result of a 
system that, ex ante, might have seemed to provide universal benefit, ended up 
benefitting groups quite differently according to racial and socio-economic 
differences.47 
If public policy is to be truly just, it must avoid the illusion of universally 
equally effective policies that in fact distribute benefits quite unequally, 
especially if those unequal distributions tend to disproportionately disadvantage 
those already less well-off.48 In contrast, powell argues that we must target 
policies to treat different groups differently in order to produce a more 
universal effect – which he calls “targeted universalism” – so that the results 
are justly distributed.49 This approach is necessary in order to keep scarce 
resource triage from greatly benefitting those who are already best-off.50  
II. CURRENT METHODS 
To guide a discussion of what might be done to more justly distribute 
scarce resources this paper will examine three attempts to ameliorate the effect 
 
 42. See Biddison et al., supra note 22, at 850 (explaining those already disadvantaged would be 
further burdened by an approach favoring long-term survival). 
 43. Biddison et al., supra note 22, at 850. 
 44. john. a. powell [sic author intentionally does not capitalize his name], Post-Racialism or 
Targeted Universalism?, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 785, 794 (2009). 
 45. See id. (explaining how programs universal on their face ultimately benefited whites more than 
non-whites); see also H. R. REP. NO. 2022 at 2–3 (1956) (explaining the need for highways for the 
overall economy as a whole and the need to meet current and future traffic demands). 
 46. powell, supra note 44, at 794; see also 394 U.S. 294, 298–300 (1955) (reiterating that racial 
discrimination in public schools is unconstitutional and granting enforcement authority to U.S. District 
Courts). 
 47. See powell supra note 44, at 298–300 (explaining disparities resulting through a program that 
appeared to provide a universal benefit). 
 48. powell, supra note 44, at 790. 
 49. powell, supra note 44, at 803. 
 50. powell, supra note 44, at 803. 
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of previous attempts to produce good results for persons already disadvantaged 
in society prior to the onset of the need for a scarce resource. 
a. UNOS and Organ Distribution 
Perhaps the most well developed system for distributing scarce resources 
in the U.S. is The United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) and the various 
entities that together make up the organ distribution system in the U.S., 
organized under the administrative system determined by the National Organ 
Transplant Act of 1984 and its later modifications.51 That system establishes 
organs for transplant as a national resource and aims to use that resource to 
save the maximum number of lives and, in some cases, maximize the years of 
life saved.52 Criteria for kidney allocation are the most complex, and consider a 
multitude of factors including (1) the quality of the donated kidney, (2) immune 
system compatibility, (3) distance, and (4) how long the recipient has been 
waiting for an organ.53 Significant jumps in priority exist for persons for whom 
fewer organs will work well who match a particular organ, including pediatric 
patients, and for recipients who were previously living donors.54 With the 
exception of waiting time, all of these factors are geared towards distributing 
the scarce organs to maximize successful transplants and improve survival rates 
attached to successful transplants.55 Granting preference for prior donors is 
presumably meant to increase the number of donors by a number larger than 
the number of former donors now needing a transplant, and so creates more 
successful transplants.56 In 2015, the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services added a rule aiming to match recipients with higher “Expected Post-
transplant Survival,” in terms of years of life after transplant, to the highest 
quality kidneys donated in an effort to increase the number of life-years 
 
 51. 42 U.S.C. § 274 (2019); 42 C.F.R. § 121 (2019). 
 52. Alexandra K. Glazier, The Lung Lawsuit: A Case Study in Organ Allocation Policy and 
Administrative Law, 14 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 139, 142–43 (2018). 
 53. See How Organ Allocation Works, ORGAN PROCUREMENT & TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK,  
https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/learn/about-transplantation/how-organ-allocation-works/ (last visited 
Mar. 4, 2020) (explaining organ allocation priorities including factors involving justice and medical 
utility). 
 54. See ORGAN PROCUREMENT & TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK, POLICIES, 184–99 (2019) 
https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/media/1200/optn_policies.pdf (explaining policies of priority relating to 
liver and liver-intestine transplantation); see also Pre-Implementation Notice: Liver and Intestinal 
Organ Distribution Based on Acuity Circles to be Implemented Feb. 4, ORGAN PROCUREMENT & 
TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK (Jan. 20, 2020), https://unos.org/news/pre-imp-notice-liver-intestinal-
dist-acuity-circles-feb-4-2020/ (explaining changes prioritization based on factors such as distance, 
medical urgency, and pediatric status). 
 55. Glazier, supra note 52, at 142. 
 56. Mélanie Levy, State Incentives to Promote Organ Donation Honoring the Principles of 
Reciprocity and Solidarity Inherent in the Gift Relationships, 5 J. OF L. AND THE BIOSCIENCES 398, 413 
(2018). 
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received per transplant.57  Other organs have less complicated distribution 
systems, but are still organized under the aim of maximizing the results from 
donated organs.58  
The focus on maximization of benefit is ameliorated somewhat by several 
modifiers in the selection procedure that are not strictly ends-based. Prior live 
organ donors are given strong preference, which is not accessible to all persons 
as not all are acceptable candidates for organ donation. Time, however, can 
flatten the inequalities that make some people more likely to be acceptable 
candidates.59 Time spent on the list counts for points on the list, which can 
eventually move someone who is a marginally less likely candidate to 
maximize years of life ahead of a more likely candidate to do so.60 This would 
appear to be an attempt to put some element of fairness into the system: any 
person, regardless of difficulty of matching a kidney, or likelihood of surviving 
long after receiving one, can make it to the top of the list and receive an organ. 
With lifespans of between five to ten years on dialysis reasonably possible, 
time on the list can become the dominant factor.61 Even in this system that is 
heavily weighted towards producing the most life-years, using time in the 
system as a factor is a serious method of equalizing opportunity that flattens the 
benefit from other factors.62  
Medicare’s end-stage renal disease (ESRD) policy creates a serious 
difference between kidney allocation and other forms of medical resource 
distributions in the U.S. Through Medicare, every citizen in need has full 
funding for kidney dialysis.63 One major form of inequality in the U.S. is access 
to affordable health care, and this is somewhat ameliorated in the case of 
kidney dialysis. Being on dialysis would bring a patient to the attention of 
clinicians that could have them placed on a list for a kidney. Two major factors, 
time and access, make distribution of kidneys more equitable, even though they 
 
 57. Board Approves Significant Revisions to Deceased Donor Kidney Allocation Policy, ORGAN 
PROCUREMENT AND TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK (June 25, 2013), 
https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/news/board-approves-significant-revisions-to-deceased-donor-kidney-
allocation-policy/. 
 58. How Organ Allocation Works, supra note 53. 
 59. Zhai Yun Tin, What Happens When a Living Kidney Donor Needs a Transplant?, KAISER 
HEALTH NEWS (Sept. 1, 2016), https://khn.org/news/what-happens-when-a-living-kidney-donor-needs-
a-transplant/. 
 60. ORGAN PROCUREMENT & TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK, supra note 54, at 137-38. 
 61. Dialysis, NAT’L KIDNEY FOUND. (last visited Oct. 1, 2020), 
https://www.kidney.org/atoz/content/dialysisinfo. 
 62. ORGAN PROCUREMENT & TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK, supra note 54. 
 63. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395rr(a) (explaining Medicare benefit is available for anyone diagnosed with 
end-stage renal disease); see generally Medicare Coverage of Kidney Dialysis & Kidney Transplant 
Services, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., (last visited Nov. 2, 2020), 
https://www.medicare.gov/Pubs/pdf/10128-medicare-coverage-esrd.pdf (explaining the Medicare 
coverage benefits relating to ESRD). 
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are nominally distributed via a results-based analysis. While these factors do 
not directly preference persons who are less well off, they can ameliorate the 
features of utilitarian analyses that tend to harm their chances. This makes 
kidney distribution more comparable to disaster triage as the criteria for 
disaster triage distribution do not take insurance or other aspects of capacity to 
pay into account. 
b. International Decisions on Rights to Health Care 
There have been a few decisions in the courts of countries other than the 
U.S. that may be salient to this discussion, though they can only carry the 
guidance value of foreign court cases. These cases are in the context of the 
provision of health care to citizens in countries where there is a constitutional 
right to access to health care. Despite that not being the case in the U.S., they 
are relevant here in a discussion of emergency triage in the U.S. because of the 
assumption that all persons, or at least all citizens, in the U.S. have an equal 
right to access to emergency services.64  The case most to the point of this 
discussion is the South African case of Soobramoney v Minister of Health.65 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa guarantees the right to 
have access to health care services to everyone, and holds that the state must 
take reasonable measures, within its available resources, to ensure this right.66 
The 1997 Soobramoney v Minister of Health case tested the meaning of this in 
the context of limited resources.67 Mr. Soobramoney was diabetic and also had 
ischemic heart disease and cerebro-vascular disease.68 His kidneys failed in 
1996 and his condition was diagnosed as irreversible.69 He sought dialysis and 
was refused on the grounds that the facilities of the hospital were too limited to 
provide dialysis to all persons in need of it.70 The hospital would automatically 
provide dialysis to patients with reversible acute kidney failure, and triaged 
patients with chronic kidney failure primarily to provide dialysis to those who 
were eligible for a kidney transplant.71 Mr. Soobramoney’s terminal co-
morbidities meant he was not eligible for a transplant, and so did not meet the 
criteria for chronic kidney dialysis.72 The court eventually held that no violation 
of Mr. Soobramoney’s rights under the Constitution had occurred, and that 
given the circumstances of limited availability it was permissible for the 
 
 64. See generally Social Security Act § 1867, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1988). 
 65. Soobramoney v Minister of Health, 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
 66. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, Ch. 2, § 27. 
 67. Soobramoney, (1) SA at para. 1. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at para. 3. 
 72. Id. at para. 4. 
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hospital to deny Mr. Soobramoney and similarly situated patients access to 
chronic kidney dialysis.73 
Soobramoney appears as a decision that argues for a more utilitarian 
response to limited resources, albeit in a different context. Implementing this 
reasoning in the situation of disaster triage would suggest that aiming to 
produce the greatest number of years of life from the limited resources 
available is appropriate. Given that the health care system in South Africa at the 
time was only a few years removed from being a tremendously unequal system, 
and unequal largely along racial lines, and given that Mr. Soobramoney was 
requesting treatment from the state because he could no longer afford private 
care, it is likely that the inequality in his situation is similar to or greater than 
the inequality between persons in the U.S. needing care in a disaster.74 So, 
insofar as there is a similarity here, the Soobramoney case argues for seeking 
the greatest number of years of life, regardless of prior inequality. If this is a 
guide for practice in the U.S., perhaps that it is the advice given when a system 
cannot provide for all. 
However, two factors should modify this conclusion. First, the decision is 
described as “infamous” by equality advocates75 and the decision made in the 
case is described as “tragic” and “agonising” by Justice Sachs in a concurring 
opinion.76 This decision may describe a response to the state of both inequality 
and the health care system in South Africa in the years immediately following 
the fall of apartheid.77 The appropriate response to this decision may be to 
recognize that major steps need to be taken to improve the systemic inequality 
in the country and its health care system and, consistent with the positive 
requirement that the government provide needed health care, such action must 
be taken.  
This is suggested by the second modifying factor: that cases that followed 
Soobramoney have decided differently in comparable circumstances. The 
Grootboom case in 2000 held that a Constitutional right to adequate housing 
was violated by removing persons from ‘informal’ housing on private property 
without providing them with an adequate replacement.78 In 2002 the Treatment 
Action Campaign succeeded in arguing that the government must provide drugs 
to HIV-positive pregnant women to help prevent transmission during birth.79 
 
 73. Id. at para. 36. 
 74. Khetho Lomahoza, Monitoring the Right to Health Care in South Africa: An Analysis of the 
Policy Gaps, STUDIES IN POVERTY AND INEQUALITY INSTITUTE 5 (2013), http://spii.org.za/wp-
content/uploads/2018/02/Policy-brief-2_Monitoring-rights_Healthcare.pdf. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Soobramoney, (1) SA at para. 57-59 (Sach, J. concurring). 
 77. Apartheid, Encyclopedia Britannica (Feb. 5, 2020), http://www.britannica.com/topic/apartheid. 
 78. Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v. Grootboom and Others, 2000 (1) SA 
46 (CC) at para. 99 (S. Afr.). 
 79. Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign, 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) at para. 136 (S. Afr.). 
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Both the right to adequate housing and the right to access to medical care are a 
part of the comprehensive Bill of Rights that comprises the second chapter of 
the Constitution, and both are a part of the overall mandate of the Constitution 
to protect human rights.80 Based on these cases that followed Soobramoney it 
may be right to see Soobramoney as more of a call to action than a decision to 
serve as primary guidance.  
c. The Minnesota Pandemic Ethics Project  
In 2010, The Minnesota Pandemic Ethics Project produced two reports 
providing guidance for the development of a plan to both prepare for a 
pandemic and to guide resource distribution in the case that the need in a 
pandemic overwhelmed supply.81 Their reports explicitly refers to the challenge 
of just distribution in the case of needing to ration resources, making public 
engagement in the process of devising the distribution plan, and issues of social 
justice specific points of importance in the plan.82 As such, a close analysis of 
the results may show results applicable not only to Minnesota, but to other 
states or the U.S. as a whole as well. 
The reports are a promising effort to produce public policy with an aim of 
bringing justice in distribution for the needs of those least well-off before a 
pandemic hits.83 Fairness in distribution is a primary goal.84 A policy designed 
according to these guidelines would promote three goals: (1) protecting the 
population’s health, by reducing mortality and serious morbidity from disease 
and from damage to the public order; (2) protecting the public safety and civil 
order; and (3) striving for fairness and protecting against systematic 
unfairness.85 The last point is to be accomplished by:  
Reducing significant group differences in mortality and serious 
morbidity; Making reasonable efforts to remove barriers to access; 
Making reasonable efforts to reciprocate to groups accepting high 
risk in the service of others; Rejecting strategies that are 
discriminatory or exacerbate health disparities; and Using fair 
random processes for those similarly prioritized.86  
 
 80. SOUTH AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION. ANNUAL REPORT FOR THE YEAR ENDING 31 
MARCH 2019, 7, 13-14 (2019). 
 81. DEBRA A. DEBRUIN ET AL., IMPLEMENTING ETHICAL FRAMEWORKS FOR RATIONING SCARCE 
HEALTH RESOURCES IN MINNESOTA DURING SEVERE INFLUENZA PANDEMIC 6 (2010); DOROTHY E. 
VAWTER ET AL., FOR THE GOOD OF US ALL: ETHICALLY RATIONING HEALTH RESOURCES IN 
MINNESOTA IN A SEVERE INFLUENZA PANDEMIC (2010). 
 82. VAWTER et al., supra note 81; see also DEBRUIN et al., supra note 81, at 29, 30, 34. 
 83. DEBRUIN et al., supra note 81, at 34; see also VAWTER et al., supra note 81, at 17. 
 84. DEBRUIN et al., supra note 81, at 113; see also VAWTER et al., supra note 81, at 17. 
 85. VAWTER et al., supra note 81, at 18; see also DEBRUIN et al., supra note 81, at 63. 
 86. VAWTER et al., supra note 81, at 18. 
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As such, a policy designed on this structure would have at least the idea of 
targeted universalism and fairness built in.  
However, what specific policies these three goals lead to will depend 
upon the relative weight given to each priority. As a simple example, in regard 
to the first goal, any distribution of life-saving resources that gets scarce 
resources to at least some members of the population that need them, no matter 
to whom, will reduce some mortality and serious morbidity. Therefore, if a 
policy were to focus on the latter two concerns, protecting public safety or 
striving for fairness, it could still meet the criterion of the first by producing 
some reduction in mortality and serious morbidity, even if a different 
distribution might produce a greater decrease. If, on the other hand, one were to 
seek to maximize the first goal of the reduction of mortality and serious 
morbidity, a different type of distribution would be necessary. The second of 
the two reports from the Minnesota Pandemic Ethics Project [hereafter, “For 
the Good of Us All”] recommends three clearly valuable aims for a pandemic 
response policy; the details of the policy will differ, perhaps dramatically, 
depending upon the value placed on each of the three goals.87 For the Good of 
Us All indicates, however, that there is an obligation to use “fair random 
processes for those similarly prioritized,”88 which is an excellent way to seek to 
make matters more fair for all involved. Yet, if prioritization places those more 
likely to survive if given the resource above those less likely to survive, this 
equalization technique will not reduce or remove the underlying problem of the 
least well-off being additionally burdened in a pandemic. 
 Initially, For the Good of Us All appears to support prioritizing the 
fairness of the distribution of treatments. It strongly recommends community 
engagement with the decision-making process as crucial to good disaster 
planning, so that communities who are least well off can have input into the 
plan that is developed.89 It also recommends the easy and obvious exceptions to 
the principles of distribution such as deprioritizing persons who cannot benefit 
from the resource, persons who are going to die soon from a different co-
morbidity regardless, and persons who are already assumed to be immune due 
to prior vaccination or recovery from the illness – which would free up 
resources for those who are not in these categories.90 Some specifics in For the 
Good of Us All also aim at protecting persons at heightened risk rather than 
those likely to produce best results.91 For example, it recommends prioritizing 
pregnant women for antivirals as being at disproportionately high risk of 
 
 87. VAWTER, supra note 81, at 18. 
 88. VAWTER, supra note 81, at 18. 
 89. VAWTER, supra note 81, at 18. 
 90. VAWTER, supra note 81, at 20, 29, 38 
 91. VAWTER, supra note 81, at 10. 
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mortality, whether or not that would produce the greatest returns.92 Of course, 
this policy would likely be met with general public approval, but For the Good 
of Us All also argues that other groups who face higher morbidity and mortality 
can be treated in this fashion: “For example, it may become evident during a 
pandemic that a particular demographic group or group with compounded 
social vulnerabilities may prove to be at exceptionally high risk of death.”93 For 
the Good of Us All recommends prioritizing “those groups of the general 
public who are at the greatest risk of flu-related mortality or serious 
morbidity,”94 which would provide resources to the worst off first. This is done 
with regard to influenza vaccinations in normal (non-pandemic) times of 
scarcity when, for example, the very old and very young are prioritized.95 
Because death rates from normal influenza are a U-shaped curve with the very 
young and the very old being at highest risk of death, this is consistent with a 
distribution that minimizes overall morbidity and mortality.96 In other 
circumstances where that is not the case, as with distribution of mechanical 
ventilator support for extreme cases, the Report makes recommendations less 
obviously targeted at the least well-off.97 
For ventilators, For the Good of Us All seems to prefer a more utilitarian 
approach: “This recommended ethical framework emphasizes clinical criteria. 
The clinical considerations help identify those most likely to benefit from 
access to a ventilator and reflect the panel’s commitment to reduce mortality 
and serious morbidity effectively and efficiently.”98 This is motivated in part by 
the nature of the circumstance which necessitates a ventilator:  
Ventilators are particularly time-critical resources. When someone 
develops breathing problems a decision needs to be made in short 
order whether a ventilator is available and who should receive it. 
There will be times that ventilators are extremely scarce and several 
people with similar likelihood of benefit will compete for access. 
Ventilators are given to people who are seriously ill from any 
number of causes. Therefore rationing decisions are less about which 
groups should receive ventilators before others and more narrowly 
focused on comparing the clinical likelihood of benefit of specific 
individual patients in a particular critical care unit.99  
 
 92. VAWTER, supra note 81, at 28. 
 93. VAWTER, supra note 82, at 33. 
 94. VAWTER, supra note 81, at 19. 
 95. See CTRS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 10 (explaining prioritization of 
infants and toddlers in the case of influenza vaccine scarcity). 
 96. Influenza (Flu): People at High Risk for Flu Complications, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL 
AND PREVENTION (Aug. 27, 2018), https://www.cdc.gov/flu/highrisk/index.htm. 
 97. See VAWTER, supra note 81. 
 98. VAWTER, supra note 81, at 55. 
 99. VAWTER, supra note 81, at 55 (emphasis omitted). 
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Specifically, they recommend prioritizing “patients who have a 
significantly greater likelihood of survival according to a standardized, 
evidence-based, clinical tool recommended by MDH…. [and] patients not 
likely to require more than short-term reasonable levels of critical care 
resources.”100  
The Minnesota Pandemic Ethics Project is a tremendous step forward in 
development of disaster triage policies that can alleviate rather than exacerbate 
the underlying problems of injustice in distribution of universally valuable 
goods. Though the Project’s conclusions do not uniformly design policies that 
avoid increasing harm to the least-well-off in a disaster, it takes the problem 
extremely seriously and is an excellent guide for any future policy designs. It is 
vague, perhaps necessarily so, on how exactly to balance its three competing 
goals, but it has made good progress and allows for more. 
III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DISASTER TRIAGE 
If we intend to justly distribute limited resources in the case of a disaster, 
then we must pay attention to making prior inequities less damning. 
Unfortunately, something like the ‘time on the list’ criterion used with kidney 
donors is not possible in a disaster. Devices like ‘first-come first served’ will 
also tend to harm rather than help the less well off, as expense, travel, 
childcare, time off work, and the like all benefit more well-off candidates for 
self-selecting treatment. Further, those who avoid getting care until it cannot be 
avoided will of course be in worse condition when they arrive. I can think of 
two types of options possible; one is clearly preferable but may not be feasible; 
the other is definitely possible but will not specifically benefit the least well off. 
The first is to find a mechanism that will identify the least well off and 
grant them preference in treatment, at least to the point where their chance of 
obtaining care is not explicitly harmed by their poorer condition caused by 
inequality in society. The goal would be to make people’s chances of obtaining 
scarce resources equivalent to what they would have been if people did not 
have poorer health due to social inequality. Once those inequalities were 
effectively removed from the way people were treated by distribution methods, 
then a distribution that maximized benefit would be fairer. However, it is 
unclear what such an inequality rectifying mechanism might be. The Minnesota 
Pandemic Ethics Project may provide a starting point for seeking for such 
mechanisms, although it cannot fully provide such a tool at this point.  
The second, less preferable option, would have to be some sort of 
randomization method that would grant all persons in reasonable need of scarce 
resources an equal chance at those resources. Though this random distribution 
would not allow for targeted distributions to maximize lives saved, it is the only 
 
 100. VAWTER, supra note 81, at 53. 
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way, barring some discovery of a mechanism like that discussed above, not to 
make those unfairly made less-well-off by a system in which unearned social 
determinants of health determine one’s health conditions also unjustly 
disadvantaged by scarce resource distribution. Drawing straws may not produce 
the maximized outcome in terms of years of life saved, but it is more just.  
 
